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Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Climate 
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Simon Dietz, Ben Groom, and William A. Pizer
Summary
Our efforts to put the brakes on climate change or adapt to a warming climate present a 
fundamental tradeoff between costs borne today and benefits that accrue to the children 
and grandchildren of the current generation. In making investments today that affect future 
generations’ prospects, we need to think carefully about how we value their welfare compared 
to our own. 
A common economic formula recommends giving up only 5 cents today for every dollar of 
benefits 100 years in the future; we call this discounting the future. Underlying this approach 
is the assumption that future generations will be much better off than our own, just as we are 
much wealthier than our ancestors were. Would our descendants’ agree with this approach? 
Are there reasons to put more value on future benefits?
William Pizer, Ben Groom, and Simon Dietz discuss three possible reasons that we might 
put a higher value on future benefits. First, people disagree considerably about the correct 
discount rate. Other plausible interpretations of society’s preferences or observed data could 
increase the weight we place on future benefits by as much as a factor of five. Second, we may 
have failed to correctly value future climate change impacts, particularly those related to the 
loss of environmental amenities that have no close monetary substitutes. Third, we may not be 
properly valuing the risk that a warming climate could cause sudden and catastrophic changes 
that would drastically alter the size of the population. 
Ultimately, the authors write, many of the choices about how we value future generations’ 
welfare come down to ethical questions, and many of the decisions we must make come down 
to societal preferences—all of which will be difficult to extract from data or theory.
www.futureofchildren.org
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Future generations are the current generation’s children, grandchildren, and so on. That intergenerational perspective gives rise to extremely thorny 
questions about how to evaluate and make 
trade-offs between the wellbeing of current 
generations and the wellbeing of their 
descendants. In the context of climate 
change, we can’t avoid intergenerational 
comparisons because greenhouse gas 
emissions today produce impacts that will 
last for hundreds of years. Therefore, we 
must analyze trade-offs over extremely long 
time horizons. In short, the payoffs from our 
own costly mitigation efforts will accrue to 
our children and their descendants. As will 
be made plain, to make decisions in the face 
of such dynamics, we must carefully analyze 
efficiency and equity. In particular, we can 
imagine asking whether our children will look 
back and take issue with how we valued their 
welfare compared with our own.
The principal economic tool for decision 
making is cost–benefit analysis (CBA). In 
a CBA, all current and future costs and 
benefits, or net benefits, in each period are 
given a weight and are then summed, with 
costs entered as negative benefits. Policy 
options with higher net benefits are generally 
preferred. Current costs and benefits have a 
weight of one. The weight placed on future 
costs and benefits is determined by a number 
known as the discount rate and, more 
specifically, in the case of societal rather than 
private decision making, the social discount 
rate (SDR). The SDR determines how 
quickly the weight placed on future costs and 
benefits diminishes with the time horizon 
being considered: the higher the SDR, 
the lower the influence of future costs and 
benefits on present values. When we consider 
long time horizons, as we must with climate 
change, small changes in the SDR can lead to 
extremely large differences in the weight we 
place on future costs and benefits.
What determines the SDR depends on how 
we conceive of social welfare across time 
and/or generations in the first place. The 
standard CBA approach is grounded in a 
welfare framework known as discounted 
utilitarianism (DU). In DU, welfare in future 
years and for future generations is added 
together, with future generations effectively 
viewed as extensions of ourselves further into 
the future (a representative-agent approach). 
A key feature of DU is that we value 
additional dollars less as we become richer. 
Coupled with the assumption that continued 
economic growth will leave our future selves 
(children and grandchildren) better off, this 
tends to support significant discounting of 
dollar-valued benefits in the future. But how 
much discounting? 
Small changes in the social 
discount rate can lead to 
extremely large differences in 
the weight we place on future 
costs and benefits.
As we’ll see, a typical application of the 
DU framework leads to weighting dollar-
valued costs and benefits a hundred years 
in the future at roughly one-twentieth of 
the value of similar costs and benefits today. 
Some people, perhaps even our descendants 
themselves, might view such a weighting 
as incorrect or inequitable. Therefore, we 
explore a variety of reasons we might make 
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the weighting more favorable for future 
generations. 
Most significantly, scholars who work on 
DU disagree about which parameters we 
should use to reach the SDR and how 
those parameters should be calculated. 
One disagreement has been over whether 
to use a normative approach or a positive 
approach. Broadly speaking, the normative 
school asks the ethical question, “How ought 
we trade off our own welfare with that of 
our descendants?” The positive school asks 
instead, “Empirically, how do we trade off 
current and future welfare?” Within both 
schools, scholars further disagree about 
how to interpret the evidence and apply the 
ethical judgments that determine the SDR.
Beyond the question of parameters, a 
number of extensions and alternative 
conceptions of social welfare across time 
(that is, intertemporal social welfare) can 
affect future valuations. One key extension 
explicitly considers the significant uncertainty 
around future economic growth and 
welfare—in our case, economic growth 
and welfare distinct from climate change’s 
effects. Another extension considers whether 
environmental resources can be substituted. 
We can also abandon the DU model 
altogether and consider other ways to assess 
social welfare across time and generations 
that are rooted in alternative conceptions of 
fairness and justice.
We could also imagine that the effects 
of climate change on human health and 
mortality could be so serious as to affect 
the size of the population, meaning that 
our choices about climate mitigation would 
affect not only how well off our descendants 
would be but also how many of them there 
would be. That possibility raises yet other 
ethical issues, such as whether it’s better to 
have large, subsistence-level populations 
or small, better-off ones. Thinking through 
such issues is a difficult task that has 
enormous consequences for the weight we 
place on our descendants when we evaluate 
intergenerational policies like climate 
mitigation.
The Intergenerational Trade-Off
The slow pace, or inertia, of the climate 
system’s response to greenhouse gas 
emissions implies that an intergenerational 
trade-off lies at the heart of questions about 
how much to cut those emissions. (See the 
article in this issue by Michael Oppenheimer 
and Jesse Antilla-Hughes for more about 
the science of climate change.) Arguably, no 
research has presented the trade-off issue 
more starkly than the set of economic models 
built to simultaneously investigate the costs 
and benefits of reducing emissions and how 
those costs and benefits are distributed across 
time. We’ll take the best-known model—
the DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-
Economy) model built by Yale economist 
William Nordhaus—and illustrate the 
important points by way of a few scenarios.1
Figure 1 plots the baseline level of aggregate 
consumption—essentially, how wealthy the 
world becomes over time in the absence of 
any action. Focusing on the “standard” case, 
we see the typical assumption that, over time, 
the world becomes much, much richer. 
Figure 2 plots the net benefits of a particular 
mitigation scenario (relative to inaction, or, in 
other words, the baseline) over the next two 
centuries, according to DICE. The vertical 
axis shows the net benefits in each period as 
a share of consumption (top panel) and as 
valued in trillions of dollars (bottom panel) 
in that period; negative numbers indicate net 
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costs in that period. This particular mitigation 
scenario is intended to hold the increase in 
global mean temperature below 2º Celsius 
(3.6º Fahrenheit). The two different lines 
reflect different sets of assumptions about the 
costs and benefits of such a scenario.2
The “standard” case in figure 2 broadly 
reflects Nordhaus’s usual parameter 
assumptions, which are typical of most 
research on the topic—at least until recently. 
The intergenerational trade-off in this case 
becomes immediately clear: for the rest of 
this century, society will have to sacrifice 
income—up to nearly 4 percent of baseline 
consumption in 2060—to avoid damages 
and adaptation costs from climate change, 
which occur mostly after 2100. Absent any 
weighting to reflect time preferences, the 
cumulative net benefits of mitigation are 
larger than the net costs. That is, in the 
standard case, the positive area under the 
curve after 2100 exceeds the negative area 
above the curve before 2100. However, 
applying the sort of SDR that governments 
routinely use would substantially reduce 
the present value of long-term benefits 
compared with the near-term costs. The 
SDR that balances the present value of costs 
and benefits in this scenario—referred to as 
the internal rate of return—is 2.9 percent, 
which is slightly lower than the 3 percent 
rate that the US government used in a recent 
Source: A version of the DICE model built by Dietz et al., which extends Nordhaus’s DICE-2013R model. See Simon 
Dietz, Christian Gollier and Louise Kessler, “The Climate Beta,” Working Paper no. 215 [Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy] and no. 190 [Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment] 
(London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2015) and William D. Nordhaus, “Estimates 
of the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Results from the DICE-2013R Model and Alternative Approaches,” 
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1 (2014): 273–312.
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Source: A version of the DICE model built by Dietz et al., which extends Nordhaus’s DICE-2013R model. See Simon 
Dietz, Christian Gollier and Louise Kessler, “The Climate Beta,” Working Paper no. 215 [Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy] and no. 190 [Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment] 
(London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2015) and William D. Nordhaus, “Estimates 
of the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Results from the DICE-2013R Model and Alternative Approaches,” 
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1 (2014): 273–312.
Figure 2. Net Benefits of a Global Emissions Path to Avoid More than 2°C Warming 
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Figure 2. Net Benefits of a Global Emissions Path to Avoid More than 2°C Warming
Simon Dietz, Ben Groom, and William A. Pizer
138 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
analysis of climate change benefits and much 
lower than the 4 to 5 percent assumed by 
Nordhaus himself.3 In other words, under 
standard assumptions, the rate of return to 
a societal investment that would keep global 
mean temperature change below 2ºC is less 
than what is required by typical SDR values. 
A global effort to reduce emissions by that 
much would fail a cost–benefit test, meaning 
that it would not increase social welfare. 
Let’s now explore how robust that result is. 
The “climate catastrophe” scenario in figures 
1 and 2 combines a very sensitive response 
by the global mean temperature to rising 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations 
with damages that rise particularly steeply 
in response to warming—a double whammy, 
if you like. As a result, human wellbeing 
initially grows but then falls back to 
current levels by the end of 2200. That 
situation contrasts sharply with the standard 
assumptions, wherein the economy grows 
by a factor of more than 10, with or without 
climate change (see figure 1). In the climate 
catastrophe scenario, the net benefits of 
mitigation that limits climate change to 2ºC 
skyrocket (see figure 2); they are already 
more than 10 percent of consumption by 
2100. In that case, not only does it make 
economic sense to keep global warming 
under 2ºC; it makes sense to do a whole lot 
more.
Herein lies our main observation from 
the DICE model: the goal of stabilizing 
temperatures at 2ºC doesn’t pass a 
cost–benefit analysis that uses standard 
assumptions about climate change and an 
SDR of 3 percent, the rate suggested by the 
US government. A 3 percent rate implies 
that dollar impacts in 2115 are weighted at 
roughly one-twentieth the value of dollar 
impacts in 2015. Yet even with that kind 
of weighting, assumptions of direr climate 
change consequences can overturn that 
result. 
In this article, most of our interest centers on 
whether weighting consequences a hundred 
years in the future at roughly one-twentieth 
the value of consequences today is correct 
and/or fair. But before tackling that issue, we 
briefly step beyond DICE to ask, “What do 
we know about the costs of mitigation, as well 
as climate change’s impacts and the benefits 
of mitigation?”
The Costs of Mitigation
What does it mean to say that mitigating 
climate change is costly? Ultimately, 
households and their children pay for 
mitigation through reductions in the welfare 
they enjoy. Policies to reduce emissions will 
raise the price of producing energy as we 
seek less-carbon-intensive alternatives. That 
means households will pay more not only 
for the energy they use but also for energy-
intensive goods such as products made of 
steel and aluminum. In response, companies 
and households will switch from carbon-
intensive, or dirty, production technologies 
to low-carbon, or clean, counterparts and/
or look for ways to simply use less electricity. 
However, all of those things have welfare 
costs. The alternatives either cost more or 
entail loss of service or convenience. Though 
there may be negative-cost opportunities that 
can reduce emissions and raise welfare at the 
same time, most economists are skeptical that 
such opportunities will be plentiful or easy to 
capture.4
It’s also tempting to imagine that costs to 
businesses somehow won’t affect households. 
However, business losses come back to 
households in several ways, including lower 
income from stocks, reduced wages, or 
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increased prices that work their way through 
the whole economy. For example, if the price 
of electricity goes up, so do the prices of 
aluminum and, in turn, aluminum products 
such as foil and cans.
It’s helpful to understand those basic linkages 
not only to make the notion of mitigation costs 
tangible but also because the scholarship on 
mitigation costs follows various approaches 
and arrives at various ways to measure cost, 
not all of which are easily comparable. 
For instance, one popular way to roughly 
approximate mitigation costs is to (1) estimate 
the cost and potential to reduce emissions of 
each of a menu of technologies and options 
(for example, energy-efficient refrigerators 
or wind power), (2) sort them from least to 
most expensive, and (3) add them up until 
the desired level of abatement is reached.5 
That approach has the advantage of extensive 
detail about low-carbon technologies. At 
the same time, since all of those options are 
being estimated separately, they might not 
add up as a whole, because implementing 
some strategies might affect the cost of others. 
Perhaps the best example is how the emission-
reducing benefits of using less electricity 
would decline if we switched to less-emission-
intensive electricity sources. 
By contrast, aggregate economic models 
emphasize relationships between energy 
prices and the supply and demand (from 
producers and consumers, respectively) for 
energy products. By integrating the behavior 
of such actors, an aggregate model ensures 
that everything adds up—but at the expense 
of retaining little detail about the various 
technologies for cutting emissions.
Stylized Facts
The extensive research on mitigation 
costs is dominated by simulation results 
from integrated economy-energy-climate 
models. The Fifth Assessment Report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) does a very good job of summarizing 
the vast majority this research.
• Most models predict that climate 
mitigation is costly and would reduce 
economic growth when considered 
against a “utopian” scenario wherein no 
mitigation takes place and climate change 
has no effect, but the reduction in growth 
prospects tends to be relatively small, 
except perhaps for the most stringent 
mitigation targets.6 By 2050, the loss 
in consumption relative to a utopian 
scenario ranges from about 0.5 to just 
over 5 percent, depending on the depth of 
emissions cuts.
• Although it’s useful to think of mitigation 
as a simple investment whereby we 
spend a onetime sum in the beginning 
to receive a stream of benefits in the 
future, mitigation is in fact an ongoing 
activity, and its global costs will rise over 
time. In this way, our children and their 
children will each face the dilemma of 
how to weight the costs they will endure 
to benefit future generations, even as they 
reap whatever benefits accrue from our 
own efforts.
• The global costs of mitigation increase 
with the stringency of the emissions target. 
Some evidence suggests that they increase 
more than proportionately.7
• Models’ forecasts differ widely in what it 
would cost to achieve the same emissions 
target. And the differences increase as 
levels of required emissions reductions 
increase. That divergence has many 
causes, including different assumptions 
about population growth and economic 
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growth, but a particularly important set of 
assumptions concerns the availability and 
costs of low-carbon technologies.8
• If key mitigation technologies aren’t 
available at a reasonable cost (or aren’t 
available at all), global mitigation costs 
could increase significantly. Carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) is a notable 
example. CCS is a technology for 
capturing the carbon dioxide from 
large emitting facilities and storing it 
in underground geologic formations. 
It makes continued fossil-fuel burning 
consistent with emissions targets in 
the short term; it can be combined 
with a range of emissions-generating 
technologies (that is, not just electricity 
generation); and it can even be combined 
with biofuels to yield negative emissions. 
But as of today, just 13 CCS facilities 
are operating in the world, and only one 
is attached to a power plant.9 When we 
purposely eliminate CCS from a range of 
models, they predict that mitigation will 
cost much more.
• Delaying efforts to reduce emissions in the 
coming years will increase mitigation costs 
further in the future, partly because we’ll 
have to make deeper cuts later on and 
partly because we’ll have locked in carbon-
intensive infrastructure in the intervening 
period. Many emissions are caused by very 
long-term investments that are in turn 
tied to very long-term infrastructure. For 
example, cars might have a useful life of 10 
or 15 years, but the fueling infrastructure 
is more durable. If the task is simply to hit 
a given emissions target at the lowest cost, 
too much delay is, consequently, a bad 
thing.
• Global mitigation costs increase if some 
countries don’t pull their weight. In part, 
that’s simply because some mitigation that 
could have taken place cost-effectively 
in those countries will now have to take 
place at a higher cost elsewhere. But it 
also reflects the phenomenon of carbon 
leakage: countries that lag in restricting 
emissions may attract carbon-intensive 
industries, thereby increasing aggregate 
emissions and making other countries 
work that much harder.10
• The costs of mitigation will vary from 
country to country, for two reasons. First, 
opportunities vary. Some countries are 
blessed with renewable resources, and 
others are not. Some countries are already 
building new infrastructure, and others 
would have to retire existing facilities 
before the end of their useful lives. That 
points to significant mitigation potential 
in large and fast-growing developing 
countries such as China and India. Second, 
national governments—both alone and in 
various multilateral settings—will make 
decisions about how to financially support 
efforts in poorer countries. Ultimately, the 
distribution of costs across countries will 
depend on some combination of where 
the mitigation opportunities exist, how 
much those countries are willing to spend 
to mitigate, and how much money other 
countries are willing to provide to meet 
the costs of mitigation.
• Estimates from integrated models don’t 
include all of the factors thought to affect 
mitigation costs. Most models assume 
that, apart from climate change itself, 
the economy is otherwise functioning 
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perfectly, or, if it isn’t, the number of ways 
it could malfunction is at least severely 
limited. Fully incorporating imperfections 
into the functioning of the economy—
something we can only imagine being able 
to do—could either increase or decrease 
global mitigation costs. One example is 
the cobenefits that mitigation would have 
for public health via reduced emissions 
of conventional air pollutants; in some 
parts of the world, those cobenefits could 
be very substantial, thus decreasing the 
cost of mitigation.11 (For more about 
the relationship between emissions and 
health, see the article by Allison Larr 
and Matthew Neidell elsewhere in this 
issue.) On the other hand, economists 
have argued that carbon regulation would 
increase the cost of the existing tax system, 
thereby adding to the cost of mitigation.12 
Costs of Climate Change
The costs of climate change fall into two 
categories: the costs of adapting to climate 
change (for instance, by increasing defenses 
against coastal flooding) and the costs of 
residual damage from climate change after 
adaptation, such as flooding from a storm 
surge that overtops those strengthened 
coastal defenses.
Costs can be further subdivided in a number 
of ways, two of which are helpful for 
understanding the nature of climate impacts. 
The first is simply to categorize costs by the 
sector of the economy in which they fall, 
which quickly leads to the conclusion that a 
few sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, 
are especially vulnerable to gradual climate 
change. However, increases both in weather’s 
variability and in instances of extreme 
weather have the potential to affect a wider 
range of activities. For instance, Japanese 
automobile manufacturer Toyota suffered 
disruption to its supply chain when Bangkok 
was flooded in 2011.
The second subdivision is between so-called 
market costs and nonmarket costs. Market 
costs are costs paid in the real economy, 
such as losses in agricultural output and 
increased expenditure on air conditioning. 
Nonmarket costs are impacts that are real but 
nonetheless aren’t paid directly in the real 
economy—notably, the value most people 
would put on lost human health and damage 
to the natural environment beyond simple 
market losses. Not all research explicitly 
distinguishes between the two, but some 
important work has shown that nonmarket 
impacts, when rendered equivalent to 
market impacts by a technique called shadow 
pricing, are relatively substantial—perhaps 
greater than market costs.13 We return to this 
topic at the end of the next section.
Stylized Facts
Research on the impacts of climate change 
is voluminous and, partly because those 
impacts are so diverse, much of it focuses 
on a particular impact. For example, one 
researcher might build a crop model to 
analyze agricultural impacts. By contrast, 
few economic models seek to aggregate 
impacts. The research as a whole was 
recently summarized in Working Group II’s 
contribution to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report.
• The first few degrees of warming will 
bring costs to some and benefits to others 
(for example, increased agricultural 
productivity at high latitudes in the 
Northern Hemisphere). Consequently, 
models disagree on whether the initial 
global costs of climate change are positive 
or negative overall, though most find that 
they’re negative. At warming of 2 or 3ºC 
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above the preindustrial level, which for 
many studies has become a benchmark, 
the small set of integrated models 
estimates a global cost in the range of 
minus 0.1 to 3 percent of gross domestic 
product relative to no climate change.14
• Tropical and subtropical developing 
countries are relatively more vulnerable 
to climate change. They’re more exposed 
to adverse changes in climatic conditions; 
they’re more sensitive to climate change 
because a larger share of their economic 
activity takes place in climate-sensitive 
sectors, particularly agriculture; and they 
have less capacity to adapt.15
• Beyond three degrees of warming, we 
understand little about the impacts 
of climate change, particularly at the 
aggregate level. Some integrated economic 
models continue to estimate small costs 
relative to the global economy, but 
others predict spiraling costs that would 
eventually lead to a global economic 
catastrophe.16 The models agree, however, 
that losses accelerate as warming 
increases.
• No model covers all of the known effects 
of climate change. We can merely 
speculate on what would happen if we 
included those omitted variables, though 
most scholars agree that they would 
increase costs, because the omitted effects 
include some of the most worrying ones, 
such as climate-induced conflict.17
All of those observations about costs and 
benefits suggest that we should approach any 
estimates with caution. Nonetheless, most 
stakeholders and governments see value in 
trying to predict climate change’s effects, even 
if the estimates are flawed. With a sketch 
in hand of such calculations concerning 
today’s costs and future benefits, we now 
turn to the question of impacts across time 
and generations. On what basis do we judge 
changes in our wellbeing versus the wellbeing 
of our descendants and their children? 
Evaluating Our Descendants’ 
Wellbeing
To decide whether investing for the 
future is somehow “better” or “worse” for 
society, we need ways to evaluate better 
and worse. It boils down to a definition of 
societal wellbeing across time and multiple 
generations against which to compare 
different courses of action. Only then can 
we evaluate whether the costs of mitigating 
climate change outlined in the previous 
section would be outweighed by the 
benefits to our descendants and whether the 
investment in future generations is “worth it.” 
Discounted Utilitarianism
The standard approach in cost–benefit 
analysis is to weight costs and benefits at 
different points in time using an SDR. But 
lurking behind the definition of an SDR is 
a larger notion of welfare, which recognizes 
that changes in income or dollars alone 
may not be the best way to measure the 
degree to which a particular person is better 
off. Instead, welfare economics defines 
individual wellbeing in terms of utility. The 
basic difference that such a definition of 
wellbeing introduces is that, although income 
and consumption contribute to wellbeing, 
extra income’s contribution to wellbeing 
diminishes as an individual or society gets 
richer. Utility can also capture the idea that 
wellbeing may depend on things other than 
the market goods that we consume, such as 
clean air and good health.
But how should we aggregate welfare for 
many people—particularly those living at 
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different points in time? That is, how do we 
add up and then compare the welfare effects 
of courses of action that may affect both 
today’s society and future societies populated 
by our descendants? There are many ways we 
might do this, but the standard approach is to 
define the utility of an “average” person over 
a period of time—say, a year—in terms of 
consumption of market goods and, possibly, 
nonmarket goods such as environment and 
health. Those annual utilities of an average—
or representative—agent are added together 
to obtain an overall measure of intertemporal 
social welfare (a number). Each generation 
and each person is assumed to have the 
same utility function. Thus, average utility 
is typically multiplied by the number of 
people alive in each period before current 
utility and future utility are added together. 
Future utility may or may not be discounted. 
This additive, representative-agent approach 
is discounted utilitarianism, and it is the 
standard approach involved in the welfare 
economics underpinning CBA and the 
economics of climate change. 
Within the DU approach lie two essential 
issues that determine how much weight to 
place on the monetized costs and benefits 
accruing to future generations versus our 
own. The first issue is that society may 
place different weights on utility in future 
years. That’s relatively uncontroversial when 
applied to an individual, because most 
people prefer to receive a net benefit earlier, 
all else equal. But when we extend the 
principle to different generations, questions 
of equity arise. For example, imagine that 
two generations—our own today and one 
in the future—enjoy the same level of 
income and hence of utility (in this standard 
approach). Moreover, a particular monetary 
benefit would lead to the same increase in 
utility for both. From today’s perspective, 
when aggregating and adding those utilities 
together to measure social welfare, we 
might wish to place less weight on the future 
generation’s utility than on our own today. 
That is, all else equal, society might prefer 
a given monetary benefit if it is delivered to 
this generation rather than the next. 
Two essential issues 
determine how much weight 
to place on the costs and 
benefits accruing to future 
generations. The first is that 
society may place different 
weights on utility in future 
years. The second concerns 
aversion to income inequality.
Alternatively, from the perspective of equal 
treatment of generations, we might not want 
to discount the future generation’s utility at 
all when making the welfare calculation. This 
is the first essential issue of intergenerational 
equity that we must face when deciding how 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of climate 
mitigation, and it has caused a great deal of 
debate within the utilitarian tradition and 
beyond. We return to this debate later.
The second issue concerns aversion 
to income inequality. From a societal 
perspective, a given addition to income 
for a poor person is typically thought to 
raise welfare more than the same addition 
of income would for a rich person. An 
intervention (for example, a public 
infrastructure project or a climate change 
mitigation project) that yielded incremental 
income to the poor would then be worth 
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more to society than would a project that 
yielded the same incremental income 
only to the rich. For example, consider an 
intervention that lowers present income by 
$1 in 2015 and raises future income by $1 in 
2115. Let’s say that the present society has 
an income of $10,000 per capita, and that 
the future society of our descendants has 
an income of $30,000 per capita. That is, 
income has grown over time, and the future 
society is richer as a consequence. In our 
example there is no inflation, so the income 
growth is real; for simplicity, imagine that 
we are considering only a single person at 
each point in time. Here, the considered 
intervention would lower welfare. Why? 
Because $1 in the future is worth less 
than $1 today, solely because the future is 
wealthier (has higher income) and we are 
averse to income inequality. This is the 
second reason we might wish to discount 
future costs and benefits. Of course, that 
wealth effect is a double-edged sword. If 
the future generation is poorer—that is, if 
growth is negative, as has been the case in 
many developing countries over the past 
30 years—then $1 in the future contributes 
more to social welfare than $1 today does.
Typically, those two reasons for putting 
less weight on future generations combine 
to form an SDR that indicates the rate 
at which the weight we place on future 
generations’ consumption declines the 
further we look into the future. We call it 
a social discount rate because the context 
is intertemporal social welfare rather than 
individual or household welfare. The DU 
approach leads to an SDR that is expressed 
by the so-called Ramsey rule, named after 
Frank Ramsey, an eminent mathematician 
and economist from the early twentieth 
century: the SDR equals utility discounting 
(expressed as the Greek letter rho, ρ), 
added to the wealth effect, which is a measure 
of aversion to inequality (expressed as the 
Greek letter eta, η) multiplied by income 
growth (g). Thus, in the form of an equation, 
SDR = ρ + ηg. In this equation, ρ is known 
as the pure rate of time preference or utility 
discount rate, and it reflects the first reason 
for discounting the future: discounting 
future utilities. If SDR = ρ + ηg , it’s easy to 
see that the SDR increases as any one of its 
components—the utility discount rate, growth, 
or inequality aversion—increases. 
That may all sound rather abstract and 
stylized, but precisely those principles appear 
in government guidance on CBA throughout 
the world, and in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report, Working Group III, they represent 
one of the central ways of thinking about 
how to evaluate climate change.18 The US 
government’s report establishing a value for 
climate change damages discusses at length 
how to evaluate intergenerational decisions. 
Here, table 1 shows how other governments 
around the world calibrate the Ramsey rule 
for use in their domestic CBAs, along with 
analogous approaches from important reports 
on climate change.
Table 1 and the discussions in the IPCC and 
US reports suggest that 3 percent isn’t an 
unreasonable choice for an SDR. However, 
if we want to examine critiques of setting the 
SDR at 3 percent (recall that this is the rate 
at which the typical climate change project 
would not pass a CBA test)—particularly 
critiques that would place higher weight on 
future welfare—we must turn to the evidence 
underlying the parameters that go into an 
SDR.
Estimating the Social Discount Rate
Where do the numbers in table 1 come from? 
Let’s consider each of the parameters in turn. 
The essence of the pure time preference, 
ρ, can be understood by first thinking about 
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impatience. For instance, research has 
demonstrated empirically that children 
aren’t always particularly good at deferring 
gratification in relation to things like, say, 
marshmallows.19 They prefer to get their 
utility now rather than at even some very 
short time in the future: they are very 
impatient for marshmallows. That’s an 
example of impatience at the individual level: 
individuals making their own decisions for 
their own benefit. 
To evaluate societal projects, we need a 
measure of impatience that’s appropriate 
for society as a whole. It must reflect the 
fact that decisions have implications not just 
for today’s society but also for future, as yet 
unborn, generations. Some people argue 
that observing how people behave is the 
correct way to get such information. Others, 
particularly in the context of climate change, 
argue that consulting ethical principles is 
more appropriate.
In the context of climate change and of 
long-run CBA in general, the pure rate of 
time preference is typically treated as a 
normative parameter, to be guided by ethical 
arguments. The utilitarian tradition argues 
for treating generations equally—that is, ρ 
= 0—on the ethical grounds that we should 
be impartial about when a person is born or 
when a society exists. That is, societies should 
be anonymous. The consequence of doing 
otherwise would be that generations in the 
distant future would be tyrannized, in the 
sense that a weight of zero would be placed 
on their utility and hence in the DU measure 
of intertemporal social welfare.
Just as there are ethical arguments for 
setting pure time preference at zero, there 
are ethical arguments for ρ greater than 
zero.20 Nobel Prize–winning economist 
Table 1. How Governments and Reports Calibrate the Ramsey Rule
 Pure time Inequality  Social
Country/ preference aversion Growth discount rate 
Study	 (ρ)	 (η)	 (g)	 (SDR)	 	 Source	
United Kingdom 0.5% (1%) 1% 2% 3.5% (1%) HM Treasury (2003) 
France 0% 2% 2% 4% (2%) Lebègue (2005) 
Stern 0% (0.1%)* 1% 1.3 1.4% Stern Review (2007) 
IPCC 0% 1–2% 2% 2–4% IPCC (2013) 
Nordhaus 2–3% 1% 2% 4–5% Nordhaus (2007) 
Notes: The rates in parentheses for the United Kingdom and France are the rates of discount for time horizons longer than 
300 years. In the French case, the reduction occurs at 30 years. In the UK case, there is a stepped decline from 3.5 to 1 
percent over that period. 
Sources: HM Treasury, The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (London: HM Treasury, 2003; 
revised 2011); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Daniel Lebègue, Révision du Taux d’Actualisation des Investissements Publics (Paris: 
Commissariat Générale du Plan, 2005); William D. Nordhaus, “A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change,” Journal of Economic Literature 45 (2007): 686–702, doi: 10.1257/jel.45.3.686; Nicholas Stern, The Economics of 
Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
*The figure in parentheses reflects the likelihood that society won’t exist because of some catastrophic event, which Stern 
added to the pure time preference of 0 percent. The Stern SDR is an average of many different analyses contained in the 
Stern Review.
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Kenneth Arrow has discussed the trade-
off between morality and self-regard as an 
ethical argument for treating current and 
future generations’ utilities unequally.21 
His argument is that imposing equal 
treatment may tyrannize the present 
through onerous savings or investment 
requirements. In essence, when the utility 
discount rate is zero, increments to the 
utility of generations millions of years into 
the future have the same effect on social 
welfare as do increments today. Moreover, 
there are many of those generations! This 
would indicate that the current generation 
ought to invest in many more lower-return 
projects. However, the notion of self-regard 
proposes that individuals need not adhere 
to the morality of equal treatment if it 
comes at too great a cost to themselves. In 
particular, Arrow concludes that “the strong 
ethical requirement that all generations be 
treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts 
a very strong intuition that it is not morally 
acceptable to demand excessively high 
savings rates of any one generation, or even 
of every generation.”22
Another argument for discounting future 
utilities is the possibility that as a result 
of some external catastrophe, future 
generations may not exist at all. In that case, 
a separate term would be added to the pure 
rate of time preference to reflect the hazard 
rate of catastrophe.23 This argument has 
found some support within the utilitarian 
tradition, although recently, some detractors 
have said that “from the ethical standpoint it 
may . . . seem questionable to make such a 
bet on the existence of future generations.”24
How have recent studies of climate change 
approached the issue of where to set the 
value of ρ? The Stern Review—a highly 
influential report on the economics of 
climate change undertaken for the UK 
government—took the view that barring a 
small probability of global societal collapse 
of 0.1 percent per year, each generation’s 
wellbeing should be treated equally: thus, 
ρ = 0 percent, but to that should be added 
a hazard rate of 0.1 percent. This choice 
contrasts with the UK Treasury guidelines on 
cost–benefit analysis referred to in table 1. 
Based on a variety of empirical studies, these 
guidelines argue that the risk of catastrophe 
in the UK is 1 percent per year. On top of 
that is a pure time preference of 0.5 percent, 
leading to an overall discount rate for utility 
of 1.5 percent.
Nordhaus, the developer of the DICE 
model, took a very different approach. He 
made the additional assumption that markets 
would equate the SDR in the equation SDR 
= ρ + ηg to the market rate of interest. He 
then calibrated the parameters (particularly 
ρ) around the market interest rate, using 
empirical estimates of g and η.25 That led to ρ 
of 1.5 to 3 percent. Linking the calculation to 
observed market rates is sometimes referred 
to as a positive or descriptive approach to 
identifying the correct SDR. And we’ve 
covered but a few of the ways to estimate the 
pure rate of time preference.26
Within the Ramsey framework of SDR = 
ρ + ηg, the parameter η reflects aversion 
to income inequality. Here we’re thinking 
about potential inequality across generations. 
However, there are other interpretations 
of the parameter in different contexts. For 
instance, it might also be assumed to govern 
inequality aversion between individuals 
at the same point in time or inequality 
aversion across different risky states of the 
world.27 Consequently, people have used 
different methods of estimating parameter 
η: for example, progressivity of income tax 
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schedules (known as intratemporal inequality 
aversion), ethical introspection (intratemporal 
or intertemporal inequality aversion), 
international transfers of aid (international 
inequality aversion), observed consumption 
behavior at the aggregate or individual level 
(intertemporal substitution), experiments 
involving risk (risk aversion), and so on. 
In the UK case, evidence to guide estimates 
of η comes from a variety of those sources.28 
The most recent estimates for the UK from 
observed behavior tend to suggest a value of 
around 1.5 to 1.6, whatever the type of data 
used.29 Several experts have suggested a value 
of 2 on the basis of ethical considerations and 
personal introspection.30
Taken together, different perspectives on the 
parameters of the Ramsey rule naturally lead 
to different recommendations for an SDR. 
With expected annual growth of 2 percent, 
the UK selections of ρ = 1.5 percent and η = 
1 lead to an SDR of 3.5 percent. In France, 
expected growth of 2 percent together with ρ 
= 0 and η = 2 has led to an SDR of 4 percent 
(see table 1). The US analysis ultimately 
proposed SDR values of 2.5, 3, and 5 percent, 
with 3 percent being the central case around 
which the report undertakes sensitivity 
analysis. All of this suggests that an SDR 
of 3 percent, with its consequent weight of 
one-twentieth for net benefits a hundred 
years in the future, can be criticized simply 
by disagreeing with the interpretation of 
evidence and the ethical rationale. A number 
at the lower end of the given examples—say, 
1.4 percent—would apply a weight of almost 
one-fourth to those net benefits a hundred 
years in the future, counting them almost five 
times as much against current costs as a 3 
percent SDR would.
Discounted Utilitarianism Extended: 
Uncertainty about Growth
Even if we agree on an appropriate pure rate 
of time preference and a level of inequality 
aversion, the weight we place on future 
generations depends on the economic state 
in which we think our descendants will find 
themselves. In particular, the economic 
growth rate during the next hundred 
years and beyond is very uncertain, and 
the differences among the climate change 
scenarios in figure 1 illustrate that. How 
does the economic framework deal with 
uncertainty, and what are the implications for 
the way we account for future generations 
when we calculate CBA today?
Suppose our descendants will be faced with 
one of two possible states of the world at 
some point in the future—say, a hundred 
years from now. One is a “good” state, in 
which annual incomes are high, at $30,000, 
and the other is a “bad” state, in which 
annual incomes are only $10,000. A typical 
way to summarize today the welfare we 
expect in the future would be to simply take 
the average of the utilities associated with 
each state of the world. And a typical way 
of summarizing the welfare impact of an 
intervention that, say, raises income by one 
dollar would be to take the average change 
in welfare associated with each state of the 
world. This is the expected utility, which 
could then be added up over time to obtain 
our intertemporal welfare function, as in the 
DU approach. 
How does this affect our evaluation versus 
simply using the average income of $20,000? 
It depends on another dimension of societal 
preferences, known as prudence, which refers 
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to the idea that as the future becomes more 
uncertain regarding the best guess about 
income, the value of an additional dollar in 
the future increases. More uncertainty about 
income then leads to more savings; hence we 
call that effect prudence. Assuming prudence 
at the societal level, the effective SDR should 
be lower if we are uncertain about the state 
of the world that our descendants will inherit 
versus our best estimate of the average 
outcome. Moreover, the higher the level of 
uncertainty, the lower the SDR. Thus, the 
prudence effect would likely be higher over 
longer time horizons, where uncertainty 
about the effect of growth is greater. The 
idea that uncertainty is greater the further we 
look into the future actually justifies the use 
of a discount rate that is smaller for costs and 
benefits that occur in the future compared 
with today’s costs and benefits: a declining 
discount rate.
The presence and degree of those prudence 
effects are, in general, determined by the 
same parameter that describes inequality 
(and risk) aversion, and for most reasonable 
values of that parameter, such aversion 
is often both present and large. Across 
countries, uncertainty about future growth 
would tend to justify a discount rate of less 
than 1 percent for long time horizons.31 
There is no doubt that DU, declining 
discount rates, and related economic 
theories have been extremely influential in 
policy circles.32 The guidelines of both the 
UK Treasury and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency have been heavily 
influenced by them.33 The Norwegian 
government, too, in its advice on the time 
profile of discount rates that are to be 
applied to different time horizons (the 
term structure), refers to arguments about 
uncertainty over the rate of return to 
capital.34 
Table 1 shows that several governments 
have made this theory and its close relations 
a central part of their CBA guidelines. 
In France, the SDR declines from 4 to 
2 percent after 30 years. In the United 
Kingdom, the SDR declines steadily over 300 
years from an initial 3.5 percent to 1 percent. 
The United States uses a lower discount rate 
of 2.5 percent for intergenerational projects 
and to evaluate the social cost of carbon, 
which is the current value of all future 
damages arising from an additional ton of 
carbon emissions today. 
So, in theory, uncertainty about future 
income levels increases the weight we place 
on our descendants’ wellbeing. In practice, 
such uncertainty has been shown to be 
important for long-term policy making.35 If 
uncertainty were to justify using a rate of 
2.5 percent rather than 3 percent over the 
next hundred years, as suggested by the US 
government’s analysis, our weight for net 
benefits a hundred years from now would 
change from one-twentieth of today’s value 
to almost one-twelfth. But is that the only 
omission that the standard DU approach 
makes in its parsimonious approach to 
intertemporal decision making? When we 
put monetary values on many of the benefits 
of mitigating climate change, we are making 
certain assumptions about the value future 
generations will place on avoiding human and 
natural impacts—a topic to which we now 
turn.
Discounted Utilitarianism Extended: 
Environmental Goods and Services
When we evaluate courses of action 
today that will affect the wellbeing of our 
descendants in the future, we estimate both 
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the monetized costs and benefits in each 
year and the weights necessary to compare 
those costs and benefits across time. As we 
noted in the previous section, nonmarket 
benefits such as health and environmental 
amenities aren’t easily measured, but they 
could be quite large. Moreover, if future 
generations, otherwise equivalent to 
ourselves, simultaneously face a denuded 
environment and poorer health, the value 
they put on improving those amenities 
could be even larger than the value we 
put on similar improvements today. The 
environment and health are important 
dimensions of wellbeing. Thus, to evaluate 
how changes in those amenities are valued in 
the future, it’s important to understand how 
they evolve over time alongside income and 
consumption.
Consider the following extension to 
the previous example, which looked at 
consumption growth and its effects on how 
we valued an additional dollar of income. 
Now consider two generations—the present 
and the future—whose wellbeing now 
depends on consumption and a measure of 
environmental services. Both have the same 
income levels, say, $20,000 per annum, and 
both consume identically. They differ only 
in the environmental services they each 
enjoy. Suppose that environmental services 
decline over time so that our descendants 
have 50 million hectares of forested land 
compared with our 200 million hectares (one 
hectare is about two and a half acres). How 
many dollars of consumption would each 
generation give up for an additional hectare 
of land? 
If, like consumption, the added welfare 
from additional units of environmental 
services declines as the amount available 
rises, then due to land’s increasing scarcity, 
our descendants would probably be willing 
to give up more dollars of consumption 
for a hectare of land than would the 
current generation. So increments of 
environmental goods are worth more to our 
descendants than they are to us, and we 
would place different values on changes to 
the environment depending on when they 
happen in time. If that sounds a lot like the 
wealth effect that we discussed earlier, then 
it should—only this is an environmental 
wealth effect, where increasing scarcity has 
the opposite effect of raising, rather than 
lowering, the value of changes that occur in 
the future, all things equal.
But precisely how does this affect the 
valuation of our descendants’ wellbeing? 
Empirical estimates suggest that the 
price of environmental goods could be 
rising at an annual rate 1 percent faster 
than consumption goods, an indication 
of their relative scarcity.36 Evaluating 
our descendants’ wellbeing in this way 
increases the prescribed urgency of climate 
mitigation policies when compared with 
other analyses.37 For example, if along with 
our 3 percent discount rate we undervalued 
future benefits at 1 percent per year, it would 
be appropriate to use a 2 percent discount 
rate, thus weighting a mismeasured future 
net benefit in a hundred years at almost 
one-seventh of today’s value rather than one-
twentieth.
Ultimately, to properly evaluate how courses 
of action would affect our descendants, we 
must be careful to use a set of accounting 
prices in our CBA that reflect the relative 
scarcity of environmental or health goods 
in the future, rather than assuming that 
today’s amenity values will remain the 
same. Differences in relative prices can be 
equivalently reflected in adjustments to 
Simon Dietz, Ben Groom, and William A. Pizer
150 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
the discount rate, downward for increasing 
scarcity of environmental resources. We need 
further work to understand whether current 
approaches have gotten that right.
Alternatives to Discounted 
Utilitarianism and Uncertainty
So far, we’ve focused on reasons that net 
benefits to future generations might be 
undervalued while staying within the 
standard welfare framework. But is this the 
only way to look at the problem? Does DU 
satisfy all the tenets of fairness that we might 
want to satisfy when taking a position on our 
descendants’ wellbeing? That question is 
particularly relevant given uncertainty about 
the future in terms of both how the economy 
will evolve and the potential for calamitous 
climate change. Absent uncertainty, welfare 
analysis—whether or not it considers 
fairness—tends to be dominated by the 
general expectation that future generations 
will be much wealthier than our own and that 
climate change impacts will only put a dent 
in the degree to which they are wealthier 
but will not alter the general trend. In 
that landscape, a sharper focus on fairness 
would tend to disfavor those wealthy future 
generations.
With uncertainty, we confront the real 
possibility—whether small or not—that the 
future could be worse for future generations 
than for ourselves. In that landscape, a 
sharper focus on fairness could favor future 
generations. What might a sharper focus 
on fairness look like? Naturally, there are 
alternatives to DU both within and outside 
economics. In recent years, particularly 
since the Stern Review appeared, interest 
in different conceptions of intertemporal 
welfare has been growing. Following are 
some examples to illustrate the point.
One approach is to simply increase aversion 
to inequality—specifically, aversion to the 
inequality that might occur for a future 
impoverished generation. In the DU 
framework, we often consider individual 
preferences to be appropriate sources of 
information about societal preferences, 
as we saw in our earlier discussion of how 
the parameters might be estimated. By 
simply asserting more inequality aversion or, 
somewhat equivalently, by adding aversion 
to unequal utility, we would raise the weight 
(relative to our own) placed on impacts for 
future generations that are worse off than 
our own. Prioritarianism, for instance, is 
an alternative to utilitarianism wherein, for 
reasons of fairness, the utility of generations 
that have the lowest utility levels receives 
more weight. 
Of course, increased aversion to inequality 
also means lowering the weight (relative 
to our own) that we place on impacts for 
future generations that are better off than 
ours. Therefore, another concept would be 
a more nuanced form of increased aversion 
to inequality. Specifically, we could be averse 
to leaving a future generation worse off but 
not averse to future generations being better 
off. That concept pertains to the notion of 
sustainability. The sustainable discounted 
utilitarian approach is one example of how 
sustainability can be included in the analysis. 
Models using that approach have shown that 
taking sustainability into account could raise 
the level of willingness to pay for climate 
mitigation severalfold, reducing the effective 
SDR.38 
A third possibility comes from recognizing 
that within the DU framework, aversion 
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to inequality applies equally to inequality 
across time and generations as well as 
to inequality across risky outcomes (risk 
aversion). Recently, researchers have 
explored separating those two concepts 
when it comes to climate change.39 Doing so 
lets us consider societal preferences that are 
more averse to climate risks—thus raising 
the value that future generations place on 
avoiding those risks—while maintaining 
the same relative weights between current 
and future generations based on average 
economic growth and/or the passage of time. 
Finally, quite distinct from the question 
of uncertainty and aversion to risk and 
inequality, some researchers have begun 
to explore the question of population 
ethics related to climate change.40 In most 
integrated assessment models, DICE 
included, mortality impacts are reflected by 
costing out lives through a method called 
value of statistical life. As the term suggests, 
value of statistical life is a statistical estimate, 
using observed or hypothetical behavior, of 
an individual’s willingness to pay to reduce 
the risk of death.41 Does that make sense, 
particularly when applied to the risk of large, 
catastrophic population impacts? To what 
extent are more people better than fewer if 
the larger population is worse off? Is there 
a critical, minimum level of utility below 
which life is not worth living?42 Those and 
other questions are the topics of a new and 
evolving area of research, which presumably 
could lead to placing more weight on the 
consequences for future generations.
Conclusions
As we said at the outset, choices about 
climate change mitigation involve a tricky 
balance between the interests of current 
and future generations. Current generations 
largely bear the cost of mitigation; future 
generations largely reap the benefits—
though, at the same time, they face similar 
trade-offs with their own future generations. 
To the extent that we’re interested in how 
climate change affects children, it’s hard to 
get away from the fact that today’s children 
will grow up to be a future generation, as 
will their children. For them, how we make 
intergenerational trade-offs is likely to mean 
as much as—and perhaps more than—how 
we modify the estimated costs and benefits 
for adults so that those costs and benefits are 
instead appropriate for children at the same 
moment in time.
For that reason, we’ve explored what 
economic analysis can tell us about the 
balance of those costs and benefits and 
why our future children might criticize 
that analysis. Using a well-known model of 
climate change mitigation costs and benefits, 
we estimated that avoiding a 2ºC temperature 
increase would not (quite) pass a cost–
benefit analysis. We based our estimate on a 
discount rate of 3 percent, the value recently 
suggested by the US government. Such a 
discount rate implies that monetized benefits 
a hundred years in the future receive a 
weight of about one-twentieth of the weight 
given to monetized costs today.
Why might that weight be wrong? We’ve 
explored three main reasons. First, people 
disagree considerably about the correct 
discount rate. Other plausible interpretations 
of society’s preferences or observed data 
would increase that weight from one-
twentieth to one-quarter—a factor of five. 
Even using the standard parameters but 
acknowledging that future economic growth 
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is uncertain could change the weight to 
almost one-twelfth. 
Second, we may have failed to correctly value 
future climate change impacts, particularly 
those involving the loss of environmental 
amenities that have no close monetary 
substitutes. One calculation suggests that 
accounting for those impacts might mean 
adjusting a future weight from one-twentieth 
to one-seventh.
Finally, we also examined how uncertainty 
and alternatives to the standard welfare 
approach might affect future valuation. 
Here the work is more recent and more 
speculative. However, properly valuing 
catastrophic risks, and particularly the risk 
of major population changes, could alter the 
way we value impacts on future generations.
Ultimately, our goal has not been to provide 
a different or better answer to the question 
of how we should value future climate 
change impacts on our children. Instead, we 
have tried to explain how current economic 
analysis treats our children and our children’s 
children in terms of intergenerational 
welfare. We’ve also tried to explain why 
current economic analysis might be wrong 
and, when possible, by how much, focusing 
on why an error might undervalue the future. 
None of this should be interpreted as a 
failure of current analysis: policy making at 
any moment in time requires the best 
information and judgment available. We 
believe current efforts to balance climate 
change costs and benefits are valuable, 
though they may be only part of the answer. 
Ultimately, many of the choices come down 
to ethical questions, and many of the 
decisions come down to societal 
preferences—all of which will be difficult to 
extract from data or theory.
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